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1. Limited players’ game (LPG)
In the theory of game the simplest one is the two players’ game, when one
player can easily foresee the moves of the other one, deduce his likely strategy
as the most optimal option and the outcome of the game is possible to be
preordained to a certain degree. The classic example of the two player game is
chess. In chess either white or black wins or draws. But chess is a typical zero
sum game, where the two players adopt a strategy of “bad for the opponent
means good for him”1. In real life, such games never take place.
Reality is different and diverse. Two players’ games never exist in pure
form and in most cases, the games are often non-zero sum games, where the
players have conflicting as well as common interests and leverages may differ in
great degree. Depending on the number of players and the leverage that they
possess we can classify games into two basic categories for the purpose of our
studies: limited players’ game and multiplayer’ game. When only a limited num-
ber of players in the game have considerable leverage, which can decisively
influence the final result of the game, while others have an insignificant say,
which may not be of principal importance to the final outcome of the
Game, such a game can be called a limited players’ game or LPG. As
compared to multiplayer’ game, in LPG the interests as well as likely strategies of
the parties involved may be defined more easily, thus making the forecasting of
the outcome possible to a more or less precise level. Sometimes certain math-
ematical solutions can be applied in the calculations of LPG.
One of the solutions, applicable to LPG is the Nash solution2. The Nash
solution is based on the threats that both parties pose and suggests that there
must be a certain level of utility for each player and that utility does not corre-
spond with mathematical outcome.
So in 1911, when Mongolia-Russian game has started both players had different
utility of the situation. In case of non-cooperation with each other worst outcome
for Russia would have been loss of Mongolia as a sphere of interest, while Mongolia
could lose independence. Since Russia had the biggest influence of all three players
in. the situation, they were able to dictate their terms. Nash solution (may be not
in pure form) in this game seemed to be -Mongolian independence under Russian
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influence. But Russians were playing other game at the same time with Chinese.
Since the other potential players had no interest in this game in Central Asia
Russia’s only opponent was China, weakened by the internal disputes. China was
looking to assert its own authority over Mongolia, thus there was no room for
Mongolia-China game. But Russians were playing softer to China, recognizing
formal Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia in return to concessions in Manchuria,
Xinjiang. In case of non-cooperation Russia could recognize Mongolian indepen-
dence, which may create an unfavorable precedent for Tibet, Chinese Turkestan
and Inner, Mongolia. So Russian utility in Chinese game was lower /or closer to the
root/ than in Mongolian game, but stakes were higher, Russian favored more
agreement with Chinese. So the final outcome was - China lost Mongolia de-facto,
but was able make Russians to agree on the de-jute suzerainty, Russia made Mongolia
de-facto its sphere of influence, while Mongolia had to agree to this outcome.
In general absolute Nash solution or Pareto optimality means the absolute
optimal situation for all the players. The involvement of limited number of inter-
ests in LPG makes side factors to play more prominent role, whereas in the
games, with participation of large number of players many counter interests of
different parties diminish or nullify the effect of other factors. In LPG side factors
may play greater role, at times influencing logical outcome, dictated by power
relations.
For example: what should be the optimal strategy for a prisoner, who escaped from
prison but is located and surrounded by police? Logically, if he fails to cooperate
with police and surrender he would be killed. If he surrenders he may spend some
more years in prison, but it is better than to be killed. Optimal strategy for police
is not to engage in shootings, which may hurt them and to convince the prisoner
to surrender. Seemingly the Nash solution is only such an outcome. But it may
happen that the prisoner is not sure whether he is not going to serve even longer
term for escape and resistance to police. Here the irrational strategy comes into
the picture and the prisoner may decide to fight with the police to the death.
So in games with limited number of players the psychological pattern and
type of perception of the parties influence the outcome of the game quite seri-
ously.
2. Psychological patterns of the game
The decision making is done humanely and is influenced by a number of
factors other than logic. Human beings make mistakes. Estimation of the pos-
sible outcomes and threats posed by the other player as well as understanding
of the interest and intention of the other side may be determined wrongly, over-
estimated or underestimated.
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British and French leaders between the two World Wars had not been able to make
correct estimation of the situation in Europe and the threat posed by Nazy Ger-
many. The policy of appeasement adopted by the West, at the time when Ger-
many was not strong enough militarily had given a time for Hitler to rebuild
German military might. What seemed to be the right solution of crisis for them
was only encouraging the ambitions of Hitler.
In LPG psychological pattern, the players play a more important role, whereas
in multi-players’ game, because of the need of calculating and balancing a large
number of different and counter interests the psychological factor does not play
the prominent role. In the United Nations, the decision making is not usually
influenced by the gambling of one country and is usually balanced by the inter-
ests of a number of other countries. In case of bilateral negotiations if one side
applies some moves dictated not by the logical calculation of leverages, it will
have to be accounted for. Also in multiplayer’ game a player has more sources of
interaction to weigh his decision in a particular situation: seeing the reaction of
first, then the second player possesses the possibility to make corrections into his
course of action thus limiting possible psychological over or under -reaction. In
LPG the possibility of such corrections is limited, since any move is immediately
answered by a counter move starting with the next level of interaction.
Psychological patterns in any game differ in their manifestation and influ-
ence. The player, gambling for more favorable outcome, sometimes may put at
stake too much, threatening to turn the outcome of the game negative for both.
When there is an awareness that he is likely to loose as a result of the game and
his leverage is not sufficient to change the outcome of the game, a so called
inferior psychological pattern develops. Depending on the scope of inferiority
complex, the moves of player are determined. The superiority complex is formed
vice versa.   Whether the party acts generously or aggressively depends on a
number of factors, including the psychological pattern.
If poor man and rich man are given 1000 dollars to divide between them, but in
case of disagreement nothing is given, the definite psychological disadvantage
develops in the mind of poor man. Since even small amount is more precious to
the poor, if rich man does not agree at the equal share of the sum, poor man may
agree at the smaller amount because he has to lose more in case if sum is lost due
to their disagreement. Whether the poor mail agrees at one third or one fourth or
one fifth of the total sum does depend on the leverages that both parties have and
psychological patterns of both parties. Rich man is not averse to gambling since
his utility is equal to the sum involved, while poor mail is averse to gambling
because his utility is equal to the root of the sum involved. So the poor man may
be as happy with 250 dollars as with 100 dollars.
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Creation of certain types of psychological patterns is dependent on the
amount of leverage and utility of the players as well as national character and
historical heritage. The Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese negotiations dur-
ing the Cold War certainly had different psychological patterns. The psycho-
logical aspect of the game is felt utmost in a crisis situation. Often decision
making level does not command the sufficient time to analyze the critical situa-
tion that arises and due to shortage of time the decision making is restricted to
the limited number of officials, thus making the human error more likely and
creating possibility of psychological over or under reaction.
Reactions of different states to particular situations differ, depending on
their system of values and ideologies. Revolutionary states act in different man-
ner as the status-quo states4: they do perceive their goal as well as character of
the game differently.
Roosevelt’s perception of post-war Soviet Union was of the responsible actor and
he was engaged in the normal bargaining process about the post-war world system.
While for Stalin both Nazi Germany and United States were the same adversaries,
though varying in the degree. So Stalin never believed in the US President’s speech
about peace.
The psychological pattern or behavior of a player usually affects strategy
that he chooses. An interesting observation to this effect was made by the
British biologist John Maynard Smith5. He suggested the existence of different
types of behavior such as “dovish”, “hawkish” and “bourgeois”. Psychologi-
cal patterns in real life differ in variety, and theoretical behaviors of “doves”,
“hawks” or “bourgeois” do not exist in pure form. Revolutionary or ideological
states tend to act more hawkish, while status-quo states tend to act dovish.
If the player in the LPG chooses a strategy other than the logical one,
depending on psychological factors, it immediately affects the final outcome of
the game. Sometimes the player’s strategy may look irrational, but any decision
making at any given time, space and  circumstances is influenced by the psy-
chological environment, the empirical estimation of his chances, the system of
values, beliefs and ideology as well as level of information that he possess.
The psychological patterns do not necessarily play a decisive role and
often result in a variety of solutions around the Nash solution. Sometimes when
the inferior party is aware of possible disastrous outcome he may decide to go
for extreme gambling, threatening the failure of the game and thus bargain more.
Whether his move really changes the outcome of the game does depend on his
leverage in game.
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Should the Czech Government have decided to show extreme resistance on the eve
of the Munich Agreement, threatening to counter Nazi Germany militarily, the
possible outcome of negotiations might have been little different. Britain and
France would have been forced to pressurize Hitler more, while Germany at that
time had not enough resources to counter military confrontation on the both
sides. More or less the same situation occurred in 1915 when Russia and China
(both were not in position to afford military hostilities) were trying to force
Mongolia to submit its newly declared independence. The rigid position of the
Mongolian representative forced the hands of Russians, but as a final result Mongolia
had to accept Chinese suzerainty, while staying de-facto under Russian protector-
ate.
But the study of psychological patterns is interesting because in LPG
importance of any move of a player grows, sometimes beyond the logical set-up
of circumstances. States are supposed to act rationally in a given situation,
since each state has its own national interest and it is far beyond its psychologi-
cal attachments or inclinations. It is proven from history that in similar circum-
stances reactions of different states were different and the different strategies
they followed were connected with the decision making of the ruling elite, politi-
cal traditions, ideological pursuits etc.
Psychological pattern of Mongols
Mongols are the reminiscence of the super-ethnic creation of the XII cen-
tury.
In the XII century two powerful ethnic groups were formed in East Asia. The
tongues tribe of Churchmen’s successfully defeated the Liao Empire and created
the Ching Dynasty on the Chinese territory. At the same time Mongols had
become a strong force. So called “men of long will”6 appeared among Mongols, and
became a foundation for of a strong system of administration, laid down by Chingis
Khan. After a series of successful battle, Chingis Khan was able to unite most of the
nomadic tribes of Central Asia. Already in XIII century Mongolia became a kind of
super-ethnos, caimans, keratins, man guts, talents and a number of other tribes,
some of them speaking Turkish languages were identified as Mongols. Despite
different customs, sometimes different languages, all these tribes were common in
their allegiance to Mongol princes and assisted them to conquer almost the whole
of the known world. In the Golden Horde, Tsagadai Horde and II-Khanids Hordes
the Turk language became a medium of communication and many of the conquer-
ors accepted Islam, due to the prevailing Turk-speaking Islamic population7.
Except China, where the massive peasant uprising rooted out the Yuan Dynasty,
almost in all places Mongol nobility was accepted as part of the socio-cultural
sphere and gradually assimilated other civilizations. In time, the ethnic units,
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earlier identified as part of Mongolian super-ethnos, started identifying them-
selves more with Turkish super-ethnos rather than Mongolian. Possible reasons of
Mongolian super-ethnic identity are the gradual process of settling down of these
nomadic ethnic groups and decline of Mongol supremacy. The settled tribes, sepa-
rated with the Mongol rulers, started accepting the values of the local civilization,
thus gradually identifying themselves more with the local civilization. Super-
ethnic processes such as the spread of Islam gradually separated the united identity
of nomads8. Central Asian nomads have divided into two basic identity groups-
Muslim and Buddhist.
Mongols thus have feelings of the bearers of great tradition of the past,
which are relevant or at least were relevant not only to the Mongol-speaking
peoples.
Other important aspects of the psychology of Mongols were determined
by geographical factors. The Eurasian steppes due to the extreme climate and
biological set up were basically suitable either for cattle breeding or hunting.
The Altai Mountains blocking the way of western monsoons and Khingan range
blocking the way of eastern monsoons made the steppe region dry. The extreme
climate of the region predetermined the character of nations living in this area.
The life of a Mongol was always a battle for life or death. The extreme cold of
winter, the extreme heat of summer made the nomad Mongols to adapt to the
everyday battle for life. Never ending battles with different Chinese Dynasties,
where the outcome of defeat was not simple subjugation but disappearance of
the nation, as well as their own internal clashes made Mongols to get used to the
military life. The great steppe region was never subjected to Chinese occupation
for a long time, while in similar conditions many nations bordering with China
have disappeared or been assimilated (churches, machos, tubas, tan guts etc.)
and in some cases physically destroyed.
The will of Mongols for freedom was the savior from constant foreign
domination. From the II century BC up to the modern times the tribes in the great
steppe region were conquered mostly by the same nomadic tribes. These ruling
tribes after conquering China gradually assimilated with Chinese and became
more Chinese rather than “barbaric nomads”, but that is a different story.
Mongols have a strong sense of statehood. The Great Empire of Chinggis
Khan, leaving its deep scars in the history of the whole world, has left the deep
allegiance to the idea of a Mongolian State, the legitimacy and strong sense of
statehood.
In 1911, 1921 as well as in 1990 most Mongolian leaders were deriving inspiration
from the great legacy of the past, thus making nationalistic sentiments the driving
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force of movements. After two • centuries of foreign rule, when at least three
generations were brought up in the colonial age, not only Mongol nobility who had
led the 1911 Mongolian nationalistic movement but also the masses were inspired
by the idea of a Mongolian state. The idea of a United Mongolian State was so
strong that Mongol nobles in 1912 stated to the Russian delegation that it would be
better for Mongolia to disappear than getting freedom at the cost of Inner Mon-
golian brothers’ plight9. The glory of the past and legacy of Chinggis Khan may
explain the Mongol military campaign in Inner Mongolia and broad acceptance of
the idea of pan-mongolism or unification of all Mongols.
Mongols lack the psychology of the small player. The Era of Pox Mongolia
has left a considerable bearing on Mongolian social thinking. Mongols founded
the Greatest Empire in the history of mankind.
For many centuries, the Mongol cavalry was the undisputed military leader in the
vast territory from Pacific coast to the Adriatic. The introduction of rifles and the
dominance of infantry over cavalry, has restricted the Mongol influence first over
the world and then in regional affairs. Mongol Dynasties wee either overthrown or
considerably weakened in most of the former satrapies by the XY1 century, but
Oirads, Halhas and Eastern Mongolian Khanates were still the dominating force in
the affairs of Inner Asia. The Russian advance to the East was successfully checked
by the Mongols and instead of south-east Russian drive went towards the east up to
the Pacific coast. This fact shows that the Mongols either still were the significant
military force to challenge Russia or still believed that they were. Even when the
Eastern Mongolians lost the battle to Machos in 1636, Halhas in 1680 Mongol
Khanate in western part - Dzungaria was formidable force in the international
relations in Inner Asia, conquering the Eastern Turkestan and at times posing
serious threat to Manchus.
Mongols have no experience of dealing with small players. From the days of Pax
Mongolia till today Mongols never dealt with small countries. Thus Mongols
never had the experience of behavior as a small player. Only by 1911, rudely
forced by Russians and Chinese to accede independence, Mongols felt that they
had become an insignificant force and their words could be ignored.
Perhaps that is the reason why Mongols never voluntarily degraded them-
selves to an insignificant power. Even after the independence in 1911 and real-
ization of the fact that they were negligible toy in the hands of great neighbors;
Mongols did not give up their efforts. Mongol negotiator in Khyahta negotia-
tions was behaving so rigid on the question of independence that both Russian
and Chinese Governments had to pressurize Mongolian Government to replace
the man with more assertive person.
That may explain the reason why Mongolians used to address always the
great    players whenever their questions of security and independence came.
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Using one great power to check the advance of another one was probably the
only alternative at that time, when the small players were never taken seriously
in the international relations, but at the same time this strategy coupled with
psychology of following the strongest, often led to the undisputed domination
of that power in Mongolian affairs. Sovereignty was at stake in such a game and
Mongols had to accept greater control of the “friendly power” in their internal
affairs. Russia and China were always the most important players and Mongols
tried to involve the other great players unsuccessfully. The only attempt to
bring into the game an insignificant player-Tibet (1915 Agreement) - was of no
visible significance.
Mongols have the psychological pattern to follow the strongest. This
pattern is developed by the course of development Mongolian history right
from the XIII century, when the unified Mongol Empire was founded.
All state systems, established in Mongolia before the Great Empire had pattern of
the union of tribes: Strongest chieftain, who prevailed over the others, established
a kind of suzerainty over the other tribes, but the privileges and authority of the
defeated chieftains were left untouched in most cases or fugitive chieftain was
replaced with a more loyal relative. Due to the low level of population and pastoral
cattle breeding system, more often the leader lacked the possibility to control
totally the defeated tribes and it was safer to make the chieftain to swear allegiance
to him and leave him at the head of the, tribe (because he possesses the legitimate
authority over the tribe and due to the lack of enough pastoral lands the new leader
could not physically settle the defeated tribe near to his tribe). Allegiance to the
sovereign was a strong one and breakage of such allegiance by the nomadic eti-
quette was punished severely by death and the tribe dissolved in the other victori-
ous ones.
From this period Mongols had developed the psychology to follow the
strongest.  Chinggis Khan, who made drastic changes in the succession system
of ruling of tribes (he awarded titles not by birth, but by merits) was not able to
change this psychology, developed by centuries.
From “The Secret History of Mongols” such a psychology may be traced easily:
Different Mongol tribes were joining either Chingis or Jamuha side, depending on
their rise to power. In the successive centuries Mongol tribes started following the
strongest in the clan of Chinggis Khan. The same psychological pattern has played
a role in the subjugation offal Mongolia to Manchu rule in 1680. Mongol nobles in
Dolonnuur had to choose between Galdan Boshigtu of Western Mongolia, who was
already in possession of the Central Mongolian territory and Manchu rulers. They
have chosen Manchus, a tribe of different linguistic origin but of the same realm,
who offered the continuation of their privileges. Manchus at that time were the
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same nomads, with more or less the same traditions and customs and same script.
For Khalkhas it was one of the downs in their history, when they had to take refuge
in the umbrella of the stronger ruler against the other one. Halha units have
participated in the elimination of the Western Mongolian Dzungar Khanate. Halha
princes and noyons continued to seek approval of their succession from the
Manchu Emperors. All these facts show that the Halha nobles did not see a big
difference between the Western Mongolian rulers and Manchus: for them the
Manchu emperor was another suzerain of the same realm.
In 1911 when Mongolia claimed independence from Manchu Empire,
Mongols have chosen the strongest player in the field.Russia as their ally may
be not be the strongest player by the psychological pattern but by the absence
of any other choice. When, during tripartite Khyahta Agreement, the suzerainty
of China over Mongolia was recognized, Mongols started pondering whether
their choice was the right one. This might be the reason why in 1920 the Mongol
nobles discussed the question of whose assistance should be sought to repel
the Chinese, Japar and the other imperialist powers have come into the discus-
sion.
3. The case of Mongolia: Limited players’ game
The case of Mongolia from 1911 onwards presents the case of the limited
players’ game. The history of Mongolia after the disintegration of the Great
Mongolian Empire was a LPG with involvement of Chinese Ming Dynasty,
Manchus, Oirat Mongols (Western Dzungar Khanate), Halha Mongols, Eastern
Mongols and Tibet. Starting from the XYII century when Russians came to the
Mongolian border, Ming Dynasty ceased its existence being conquered by the
Machos and subsequently different Mongolian player lost freedom. Since 1911
always there were three players Russia: (Tsarist Russia or Soviet Union), China
(Manchu Chin Empire, Republican China, and Communist China) and Mongolia.
The leverages that two greater players possess in the game were differing at
times, but not principally: Russia always enjoyed more supreme power, while
China has acquired more leverage from time to time. Mongolia was always the
smallest player of the game.
The geographical location and international situation of that time were
such that the other players capable to play more prominent role were of insignifi-
cant influence in case of Mongolian game. Great Britain was far beyond the
Himalayan Mountains and preoccupied by its Indian empire. Japan was yet to
grow to come into the stage and the USA pursued isolationist policy. Any
attempt to bring any of the other players into the picture would have meant more
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gambling than serious adventure, while the outcome of such Endeavour might
have meant alienation of powerful players.
At times two major players were playing none zero sum games (1911) and
at times zero sum games (1921 and 1960s). At times games were cooperative, at
times non-cooperative. But the truth is that the Mongolian square was always
one square in the major chessboard between two players and at times the out-
come of the Mongolian game was pre-determined by the other moves on the
other side of the chessboard. The interest of the smallest player in the game was
not generally taken into consideration, though certain basic moves had to be
made by both players to satisfy the smallest player.
a) 1911 game
In 1911 after the dismantling of the Manchu Empire Mongolia declared
independence. The new Mongolian state was not in a position to ensure its
independence by its own means and the Republican China laid claim over
Mongolia as a successor of the Manchu Empire. Russia was one of the active
players in the international relations in the Far East and had definite political as
well as economic relations in Mongolia.
Table of character of the games and attitudes of players
For this type of situation it was only logical that the Mongols would look
for the alliance with Russians against Chinese. Russians were regarding the
Chinese claim over Mongolia unfavorably and in the larger game for the sphere
of interest, Mongolia was one of the bets. Winning Mongols on their side and
given the inability of the Chinese to settle the matter by military means, Rus-
sians got the strong leverage in the larger -game. The Chinese knew that Rus-
sians were not likely to give away Mongolia easily. Russians and Mongols were
playing a cooperative game with each other; Chinese and Mongols were play-
ing a non-cooperative game. Mongols had to choose their strategy virtually
from the “lesser of the two evils”, since choosing China as a cooperative partner
 Russia China Mongolia 
Russia  Non-zero sum game 
cooperative 
Cooperative 
China Non-zero    sum 
game cooperative 
 zero sum game 
non-cooperative 
Mongolia Zero sum game 
cooperative 
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would mean the loss of independence and opposing it would mean a conflict.
Seeking for a third partner, which does not have a significant leverage, would
mean that balancing player Russia is lost as a partner, but the conflict with China
is inevitable and actually there was no other interested player.
Table of Mongolian Strategy vies a vies two major players
Russians were interested to secure their interest in Mongolia, but in the
interest of the larger game they were not prepared for conflict over Mongolia
with Chinese or let Mongols go for conflict with China. Since independent
Mongolia was not the interest of Russia and Russia did not need a buffer be-
tween it and China (in fact Russia was already in North China), the Russian
strategy was to secure its economic interest in Mongolia and de-facto supremacy.
Mongols were not easy and quiet subjects, the question of integrating them
into Russia was too early and unacceptable either by Chinese nor by Mongols,
and Russia could not afford hostility on the eastern border. The question of
letting them into Chinese fold would not secure Russian interests but alienate
Mongols. Thus the maximum gain for Russia in any strategy adopted was to win
Mongolia as their sphere of influence. Russians understandably chose the strat-
egy of minimum risk. The solution to which Russia came was to recognize the
formal Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia, while keeping Mongolia under its
own sphere of influence.
Table of Russian strategy vies a vies Mongolia
 China Mongolia 
full   support   of 
Mongolia 
conflict full cooperation 
opposition   to 
independence 
cooperation loss of Mongolia 
no   full   support, but 
no opposition 
negotiations over the 
sphere of influence in 
Mongolia 
forced cooperation 
 Russia China 
following obtain a partner lose independence 
opposing lose a partner conflict 
seeking   for   the   
third partner 
lose a partner conflict 
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Since China was engaged in the kind of zero-sum game in Mongolia and
any question about independence of Mongolia was ruled out, thus the possibil-
ity of cooperation of Mongols, they had to decide over the strategy vies a vies
Russians only. Chinese started playing a cooperative game with Russians be-
cause the total loss of Mongolia would question the Chinese authority over
Tibet, Xinjiang and other national minority regions, thus they were loosing
more. Mongols were not likely to be cooperative with them given the China’s
claim of legitimacy of sovereignty over Mongolia. They could not afford Mili-
tary campaign against Mongols: on one hand, Russians would not approve it
and throw their lot on the Mongols’ side and on the other hand, Chinese were
fighting with Mongolian military units for years in Inner Mongolia without deci-
sive success. Certainly the best strategy was to play cooperative game with
Russians to make sure that the loss is less. Eventually they had to accept the
Russian solution.
Mongols literally were forced to accept the solution: opposition to the
Russian Solution would mean the end of Russian support and face to face
conflict with China, which it could not afford. Dragging another player in the
game (Japan for example) was not possible on one hand (already East Asia was
divided into the spheres of influences) and on the other hand would yield little.
The stiffness of Mongols, sometimes even to the extent of irrational be-
havior, had played its own role in this game: Both Russia and China had to make
certain concessions to the smallest but troublesome player, leaving the practical
attributes of an independent state. Mongols still had their Emperor, capital city
and counting” of calendar era.
b) 1921 game
In 1921 the game was the same from the power point of view. Soviets
having gained still more superior power, Mongolia was asking their assistance
and China was in turmoil and not able to carry out military solution. But in 1921,
a new factor came into existence. Soviet Russia was ideologically committed to
world revolution and revolutionary Mongolia had much more appeal in Kremlin
eyes. Not much economic interest was perceived in Mongolia, but the interest
of setting an example for the “oppressed people of the East” was much more
important. In 1921, Russian military units entered into Mongolia and with their
assistance Mongolia was declared independent. Perhaps original Mongolian
leadership in 1921 had no big plans of converting the country into communism’s
show piece or never had full understanding of what communism is. They “agreed”
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to the Soviet system in return for independence but soon found that they had to
sacrifice for independence not only the socio-economic system, but also a con-
siderable   part of population. Comintern agents started training Mongols to
build communism in the country.
The best illustration of the Soviet Russian policy toward Mongolia, mixed with
ideological pursuit and geo-strategic considerations, is expressed in the letter of
Eliava to Stalin. He wrote: “The Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) has multiple
importances for us.
1. The existence of people’s revolutionary government in the MPR is important
for converting the country into the “experimental field” of non-capitalist way of
development in colonial underdeveloped countries.
2. It is a natural barrier for our eastern borders stretching over 3000 kames from
Manchuria to Chinese Turkistan.
3.  The MPR is an important supply basis for meat and other raw materials for
USSR.
4.   If the war will start in Manchuria or Far East the only possible instrument to
interact with Chinese would be Mongolia”10
Accession of Mongolia into Russia was out of the question again, Mongols,
who invited Russians, were still more nationalists than communists. Tradition-
ally Mongolia was not part of Russian Empire and wide cooperation for total
Russian rule was not expected. Moreover China would react bitterly to such, a
step and the fact that in 1924 Soviets recognized again the suzerainty of China
over Mongolia showed that Russians still had to consider Chinese reaction
seriously. Mongolia remained a nominally independent country under the So-
viet sphere. By the 1930s, the authority of the Mongolian government was only
nominal. Russians were in fact controlling everything.
The game was different in the other sense that the question of third player
was totally out: theoretical unity of Mongols and Soviet Russia did not permit
any other player. If anyone tried even to think of it out loud he was immediately
declared as a spy of imperialism and should to be executed. Soviet Russia could
gain more from independent Mongolia: it could   serve   as   an   example   of*
Bolshevik   theory   of self determination and communist revolution. With the
growing menace of Japan, Mongolia could serve as buffer zone. Chinese were
not likely to allow a third major player in the game: only real player was Japan,
which tried to organize the Pan -Mongolian independent state in 1919.
China had little leverage to change the situation: in the 1920s it was in
turmoil; in the 1930s Japanese landed in Northern China and its own indepen-
dence was under question let alone Mongolia. Ultimately in 1945, the Chinese
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had to recognize the independence of Mongolia under the pressure of the So-
viet Union.
Mongolia had little choice in the game: Chinese were still playing a zero
sum game, claiming their sovereignty and there was no other player in the field.
When Japan came into the picture Mongolia was already deep into the Soviet
sphere and hardly any question of game had arisen. Mongols had to accept de-
facto control of Russians for the nominal independence.
In this stage, psychological pattern of Mongols changed drastically: So-
viets actively penetrated into the social thinking of Mongols imposing commu-
nist values. On only one question was almost all Mongolian leadership un-
changed - the question of independence, irrespective of how nominal it was.
Soviets had to take into account this part of the psychology of Mongols: they
never seriously considered the accession of Mongolia into Soviet Union.
c) 1949-1960s
With the formation of the People’s Republic of China Mongolia found
itself in a new situation. Now all three players were playing a cooperative, non-
zero sum game. Moreover there was ideological unity between all three players.
Communist China recognized Mongolia as an independent country. Russia
needed the “Chinese card” in the situation of American monopoly of atomic
weapons. With two major players showing favorable attitude toward Mongolia,
at times “competing in their assistance to the building of socialism” in Mongolia,
Mongols gained the as most players in the game. It was still in the firm Soviet
control, but the question of open competition did not arise.
Perhaps Chinese communists were still having deep belief in their minds to
“win Mongolia back”, but to do it openly was not possible and not acceptable
to the other players.
It seems that there was hardly any influence of psychological pattern in
this period, except unanimous decision of all Mongols to assert their indepen-
dence in 1947, which was recognized by Republican China and Communist China.
Perhaps there was a wish on the part of the Mongolian leadership to enhance its
influence in Inner Mongolia, but it was never really attempted. Neither the Mon-
golian leadership had the ability and decisiveness to carry out such a task, nor
did the USSR have plans to encourage such move.
d) Sino-Soviet drift
With the Cultural Revolution in China and Mao Test Dung’s rise to power,
the two players started showing more hostile attitudes to each other. The border
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clashes between the two resulted in military confrontation.
The character of the game was changed. Now two major players were
playing a non-cooperative, zero sum game, which left little room for Mongolia to
operate. Russia needed Mongolia as a buffer between itself and China. The
Russian military force stationed in Mongolia from 1966 was a serious threat to
China. Mongolia was required to be a showpiece of the non-capitalist way of
development in the third world.
Mongolia again followed their traditional partner, for that matter the stron-
gest player again. Perhaps even if there was a possibility of choice they would
have still chosen Russia, since whether China would still consider Mongolia as
an independent country was under suspicion and Russians were in control of
Mongolia.
China started regarding Mongolia as a satellite of “Soviet revisionists”.
The “map war” started and Mongolia was renounced by Red Guards.
e) 1980s and 1990s
In the mid-1980s, the perestroika started in Russia. The Russians started
to restructure the relationship in the Far East from a different angle: they needed
to reduce the level of military confrontation and to use the saved resources for
the reconstruction of the economy. They started mending fences with Chinese.
The pragmatic communists in China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping
were not averse to the cooperative game with Russians. In the Vladivostok
speech, Russians signaled that they are ready for pull-out of military contingent
in Mongolia and soon the withdrawal started. By the beginning of the 1990s the
whole situation in Russia was out of control and the Mongolian game was
beyond the attention of the Russian leaders. After the Yeltsin’s rise to power,
Russia started to look into Mongolian affairs again, but the situation drastically
changed.
Mongolia experienced a democratic revolution: democratic govejmance
was introduced and communism renounced. There^ was no question of earlier
military strategic cooperation between the two parties and Russians most prob-
ably were not interested and not able to play the earlier game. But the basic
interests of good-neighbor relations remained the same. Mongols were still
interested in two major players as counterweights against each other’s domina-
tion. China continued its policy recognizing Mongolia’s status as an indepen-
dent country. Perhaps the game that China    is playing now   with Mongolia can
be termed   as a cooperative game. The treaty of 1960 was renewed and economic
cooperation has continued.
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Table of Character of the game and interests of the players
 Russia China Mongolia 
Russia  cooperative game 
reduction of tension 






China cooperative game 
reduction of 
tension    military 
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 to    win    over 
economic 
influence 
Mongolia restoration of ties 
balancing as 
counterweight 




The military component of the game has diminished significantly and the
economic content of the game moved to front stage. The temporary disruption
of Mongolia’s economic ties with Russia had not resulted in the tilt towards
China. Chinese had done little in the sense of development in Mongolia and
could not replace Russia as a subsidy-giver, as many Mongols might have
desired.
Mongolians are trying to balance the situation by adding a new player in
the game. Attracted by the Western attention to the changes in Mongolia,
Mongols tried to woo the West in the game. The USA was openly named in the
Mongolian newspapers as a third neighbor and relationships with countries like
Japan, South Korea and India are being actively developed.
4. The question of the third player
Introduction of the third player in the game is one of the options for
Mongolians to get out of the vicious circle of pre-determined outcome games.
The Concept of National Security of Mongolia refers: ... In foreign relations,
exercise political realism and consistently principled approach, according top
priority to the vital interests and other national considerations, and seek to
secure many partners in international relations. ... Promote the policy of
consultation with influential countries on issues of strengthening world peace and
security, of developing international cooperation, of enhancing countries strate-
gic significance and fostering strategic interests of major powers in
Mongolia.”
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Mongolia was able to attract the attention of Western countries by its
peaceful transition to democracy and comparatively successful economic ex-
periment into a market economy.
After the Cold War the situation in the international arena changed drasti-
cally. It is hard to suggest a military aggression from China or Russia in order to
control Mongolia which they never not attempted at the zenith of their influ-
ence, but it is also equally hard to suggest a country, which will come to the
rescue in the face of such an aggression. Perhaps the era of military confronta-
tion is over but it does not mean that there no such possibility in the future. In
case of internal upheaval in any of neighboring countries Mongolia might be
subject to external encroachment. In the new situation in and around Mongolia
the role of the new player is supposed to be more as an engine for further socio-
economic development of the country.
There we could name a few of players capable to get engaged in the game.
1 .The United Nations and other international bodies will play an impor-
tant role. The world has institutionalized substantially and single-handed action
against sovereign states is not common for principal actors of international
relations. Already the UN system is actively engaged in the question of eco-
nomic development of the country.
2.  Western countries could play an important role in any game on Mongo-
lian soil or its surroundings.
3.   Newly independent Central Asian republics    may constitute a base for
certain united zone of states,     where Mongolia could play its own role.
The psychological pattern developed from the years of the Cold War was
still felt in the country, making many people feel insecure by the absence of
“security umbrella”. As we have stated earlier, given the international status of
Mongolia and the fact of recognition by its two neighbors of its independence,
the direct military aggression by two neighbors seems unreal (though Iraq-
Kuwait conflict demonstrated that in the case of military confrontation with
neighbors Mongolia, lacking its own dependable  defense resources, would
face a “Hobson’s choice” Situation).
The absence of internal interest groups as well as communal or religious
contention is an important asset. The democratic institutions in the country are
set and well defined, political stability is guaranteed to a reasonable level.
Perhaps the most important sphere of activities for the Mongolian Gov-
ernment would be economic development. The economic collapse of the post -
democracy era may result in the discontent of the population. The above men-
tioned countries may play the role of the “third factor”, enabling Mongolia to
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overcome the negative effects of the economic crisis. The Mongolian strategy
is to keep open its doors for the international community in order to get the
necessary resources required for its development.
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